Electoral reform

It is, perhaps, inevitable that with a growing debate about the kind of government Britain should have, and about its unwritten constitution, there has also been increasing discussion of the need for electoral reform.

This was accelerated by the acute distortions of the [present first-past-the-post (FPTP) system during the 1980s, whereby the Conservatives, although a majority of the-electorate voted against them, enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the Commons. The virtue of FPTP, its champions claimed, was that it usually ensured strong government. Those who spoke of reform invariably advocated proportional representation (PR). In 1997 Labour established an independent commission to consider what system to put to a national referendum, and invited the Liberal Democrats to participate. The Conservatives were not invited since they formally opposed any
change to the electoral system. The Liberal Democrats were the strongest and oldest advocates of PR, having suffered disproportionately under FPTP.

The arguments in favour of PR seemed clear until its different forms were theoretically applied to the 1997 general election. Each system was then shown to have considerable disadvantages. At some stage, however, the electoral commission will have to invite the electorate to decide what it wants: to keep the present FPTP system or to choose one out of several imperfect PR options. A fundamental problem with PR is that it never serves the interests of the governing party, since it will always reduce its margin of majority. For the Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, PR is the only realistic road whereby they can achieve sufficient 'critical mass' in elections to have real impact in national politics.

Labour promised that regardless of whether PR was eventually adopted for Westminster, it would be the basis for the election for the European Parliament in 1999. The perceived success, or failure, of PR in this election, and in the Scottish Parliament (see p.136) is likely to influence public attitudes to PR for the UK.

Yet if the electorate opts to retain the present system, calls for constitutional reform will continue. No government once elected will wish to restrict its own powers. The idea of introducing constitutional restrictions on Parliament's sovereignty is strongly opposed by several leading politicians. As one veteran politician remarked, 'British democracy is - for better or worse - based on absolute sovereignty of Parliament ... What Parliament has given away, Parliament can take back. This is precisely the point that reformers fear. A Bill of Rights without a written constitution which limited Parliament's sovereignty might prove worthless. It may be that only a constitutional crisis will persuade the electorate whether or got a written constitution is necessary.

One danger with greater proportionality is of a 'hung' parliament, in which no party is able to form a government on its own nor conclude a coalition agreement with another party. In this situation the Queen would be in the difficult position of deciding how to resolve a constitutional deadlock. It would force her to exercise powers which have long lain dormant. Even without a hung Parliament, the monarch, through the phrase 'the Crown in Parliament' masks the effective sovereignty of the Prime Minister of the time. Without a written constitution what would happen if either the monarch or the Prime Minister decided the other was acting unconstitutionally? Such possibilities raise the whole question of the function and standing of the monarchy in Britain at the end of the twentieth century.